02909-25 Appleby v telegraph.co.uk

Summary of Complaint

1. Alice Appleby complained to the Independent Press Standards Organisation that telegraph.co.uk breached Clause 1 (Accuracy) of the Editors’ Code of Practice in an article headlined “I’m just ugly not trans, train driver told colleagues”, published on 9 July 2025.

2. The article – which appeared online only - reported submissions by Aslef, the train drivers’ train union to an Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) consultation. One of these submissions included a train driver’s comments when challenged on their biological sex. The article said a “train driver insisted they were not transgender but ‘just ugly’ when challenged by colleagues after the Supreme Court ruling on gender. The unnamed driver made the remark following April’s ruling, in which the highest judges in the country said ‘sex’ in equality law refers to biological sex.”

3. The article went on to report:

“In April, the Supreme Court unanimously declared that trans women are not legally women. Such people are born male and have chosen to identify as women. Many have obtained gender recognition certificates (GRCs) from the Government stating they are female. The Supreme Court case arose because the Scottish Government had refused to accept that trans women are not women, arguing that a trans woman with a GRC could not be refused access to women’s changing rooms and toilets. Judges noted that protections for pregnant women set out in the Equality Act 2010 would collapse unless ‘man’ and ‘woman’ had a clear biological meaning. Some, including Labour ministers, have insisted that trans-identifying men should still be treated as women, regardless of the court’s ruling.”

4. The complainant said that the article was inaccurate in breach of Clause 1 where it stated “the Supreme Court unanimously declared that trans women are not legally women." The complainant said the article misrepresented the law by “expanding” a Supreme Court ruling that was made solely on the interpretation of the Equality Act 2010 to encompass all law. She said the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA) remained law and all law outside of the Equality Act 2010 remained subject to the GRA 2004. She said a transgender woman with a Gender Recognition Certificate, as per the Gender Recognition Act 2004 is legally a woman in all law except the Equality Act 2010.

5. The complainant cited the following paragraphs in the Supreme Court ruling which she said specifically stated that the ruling only applied to the Equality Act 2010:

1. This appeal is concerned with establishing the correct interpretation of the Equality Act 2010 (“the EA 2010”) which seeks to give statutory protection to people who are at risk of suffering from unlawful discrimination. The questions raised by this appeal directly affect women and members of the trans community. On the one hand, women have historically suffered from discrimination in our society and since 1975 have been given statutory protection against discrimination on the ground of sex. On the other hand, the trans community is both historically and currently a vulnerable community which Parliament has more recently sought to protect by statutory provision.

2. It is not the role of the court to adjudicate on the arguments in the public domain on the meaning of gender or sex, nor is it to define the meaning of the word “woman” other than when it is used in the provisions of the EA 2010. It has a more limited role which does not involve making policy. The principal question which the court addresses on this appeal is the meaning of the words which Parliament has used in the EA 2010 in legislating to protect women and members of the trans community against discrimination. Our task is to see if those words can bear a coherent and predictable meaning within the EA 2010 consistently with the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (“the GRA 2004”).

3. As explained more fully below, the EA 2010 seeks to reduce inequality and to protect people with protected characteristics against discrimination. Among the people whom the EA 2010 recognises as having protected characteristics are women, whose protected characteristic is sex, and “transsexual” people, whose protected characteristic is gender reassignment.

[…]

266. For all these reasons, we conclude that the Guidance issued by the Scottish Government is incorrect. A person with a GRC in the female gender does not come within the definition of “woman” for the purposes of sex discrimination in section 11 of the EA 2010. That in turn means that the definition of “woman” in section 2 of the 2018 Act, which Scottish Ministers accept must bear the same meaning as the term “woman” in section 11 and section 212 of the EA 2010, is limited to biological women and does not include trans women with a GRC. Because it is so limited, the 2018 Act does not stray beyond the exception permitted in section L2 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act into reserved matters. Therefore, construed in the way that we have held it is to be construed, the 2018 Act is within the competence of the Scottish Parliament and can operate to encourage the participation of women in senior positions in public life.

6. The complainant also said the article was inaccurate to report “[s]uch people are born male and have chosen to identify as women." She said transgender people do not choose their gender identity any more than other individuals choose their protected characteristics. She added that transgender men also exist.

7. The complainant also considered the article was inaccurate to refer to “trans-identifying men". She said if this was a reference to transgender women, it was pejorative and a “transphobic dog whistle”.

8. The publication did not accept a breach of the Code. It said the article was an accurate account of a submission made by the train driver's trade union to an Equality and Human Rights Commission consultation and an accurate account of the Supreme Court ruling. It said the Supreme Court ruled that the Equality Act should be read as defining women biologically, including for the purposes of gender recognition certificates (as defined by the Gender Recognition Act) and that it is not possible to discriminate against trans women on the basis of sex, as they are not legally biological women.

9. The publication said it relied on the ruling’s following paragraphs:

(viii) It is important that the EA 2010 is interpreted in a clear and consistent way so that groups which share a protected characteristic can be identified by those on whom the Act imposes obligations so that they can perform those obligations in a practical way (paras 151-154).

(ix) There is no indication in relevant secondary materials that the EA 2010 modified in any material way the meaning of “man” and “woman” or “sex” from the meanings in the SDA 1975 (para 164).

(x) Interpreting “sex” as certificated sex would cut across the definitions of “man” and “woman” and thus the protected characteristic of sex in an incoherent way. It would create heterogeneous groupings. As a matter of ordinary language, the provisions relating to sex discrimination, and especially those relating to pregnancy and maternity (sections 13(6), 17 and 18), and to protection from risks specifically affecting women (Schedule 22, paragraph 2), can only be interpreted as referring to biological sex (paras 172, 177-188).

[…]

(xvii) The interpretation of the EA 2010 (ie the biological sex reading), which we conclude is the only correct one, does not cause disadvantage to trans people, with or without a GRC. In the light of case law interpreting the relevant provisions, they would be able to invoke the provisions on direct discrimination and harassment, and indirect discrimination. A certificated sex reading is not required to give them those protections (paras 248-263).

(xviii) We therefore conclude that the provisions of the EA 2010 which we have discussed are provisions to which section 9(3) of the GRA 2004 applies. The meaning of the terms “sex”, “man” and “woman” in the EA 2010 is biological and not certificated sex. Any other interpretation would render the EA 2010 incoherent and impracticable to operate (para 264). (23) Invalidity of the Scottish Government’s Guidance”

10. The publication said “trans-identifying men” referred to biological men who identify as women. The publication said it was clear from the article that the reference related to sex and the definition of "man" and "woman" in equality law, and in particular the Equality Act 2010. It said the passage in question would plainly be read in that context and was not inaccurate.

11. The complainant said the article conflated the ruling with all law which would mean the annulment of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 which she said the Supreme Court did not have the authority to do, nor did the EHRC. The complainant said paragraph 2 in the Supreme Court’s ruling was clear that it did not engage in arguments about the meaning of the word “woman” other than its use in the Equality Act 2010.

12. The complainant said a “trans-identifying man” would refer to a transgender man, i.e. someone who is assigned female at birth, but who is a man. She said there was no definition of “biological” other than that which was given in the Supreme Court to reference the birth certificate. She said this was a legal document and not reflective of the complexity of sex in biology but rather based on the observation of genitalia at birth. She said the document can and does change. She said referring to transgender women as men was a transphobic slur that failed to consider the full complexity of the biology of sex which included intersex conditions, and that being transgender is only one aspect of these complexities. She said this was evidenced by a body of independently verifiable research spanning multiple countries over the last 15 years into the genomes and neurological sex development of transgender people.

Relevant Clause Provisions

Clause 1 (Accuracy)

i) The Press must take care not to publish inaccurate, misleading or distorted information or images, including headlines not supported by the text.

ii) A significant inaccuracy, misleading statement or distortion must be corrected, promptly and with due prominence, and — where appropriate — an apology published. In cases involving IPSO, due prominence should be as required by the regulator.

iii) A fair opportunity to reply to significant inaccuracies should be given, when reasonably called for.

iv) The Press, while free to editorialise and campaign, must distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture and fact.

Findings of the Committee

13. The Committee considered the following reference: “In April, the Supreme Court unanimously declared that trans women are not legally women”. The Committee noted that the article provided contextual information on the Supreme Court’s ruling and what it applied to. The article said the driver had “made the remark following April’s ruling, in which the highest judges in the country said ‘sex’ in equality law refers to biological sex.” It further explained: “[m]any have obtained gender recognition certificates (GRCs) from the Government stating they are female. The Supreme Court case arose because the Scottish Government had refused to accept that trans women are not women, arguing that a trans woman with a GRC could not be refused access to women’s changing rooms and toilets. Judges noted that protections for pregnant women set out in the Equality Act 2010 would collapse unless ‘man’ and ‘woman’ had a clear biological meaning.” The Committee noted that the article made clear the Supreme Court ruling applied to the definition of “man” and “woman” in the Equality Act 2010 and this was based on sex at birth. Therefore, the Committee considered that the publication had provided sufficient explanation to show why this was an accurate summary and there was no breach of Clause 1 on this point.

14. The Committee next considered the claim: “[s]uch people are born male and have chosen to identify as women". The Committee appreciated the complainant took exception to the notion that individuals can “choose” to be trans, rather than this being an inherent part of their identity. However, the publication was entitled to use this wording and take a position on a matter on which there is a difference in view. The Committee further considered the context of the article which discussed transgender individuals and the application of April’s Supreme Court ruling in relation to the Equality Act. The Committee considered that referring to transgender women as “people [who] are born male and have chosen to identify as women” was not inaccurate where it was not in dispute trans women are typically assigned male at birth and later seek to be recognised as women. There was no breach of Clause 1 on this point.

15. The Committee considered that the sentence in the article, “[s]ome, including Labour ministers, have insisted that trans-identifying men should still be treated as women, regardless of the court’s ruling” referred to individuals assigned male at birth who later seek recognition as females and not the other way round as the complainant suggested. The publication used the term ‘trans-identifying men’ instead of the more common term ‘trans women’ and by doing so asserted its view, as it was entitled to do, of the trans status of the individuals in question. There was no breach of Clause 1 on this point.

Conclusions

16. The complaint was not upheld under Clause 1.

Remedial action required

N/A

Date complaint received: 10/07/2025

Date complaint concluded by IPSO: 19/11/2025