Decision of the Complaints Committee – 00804-20 Smith v
The Herald
Summary of Complaint
1. Marjory Smith complained to the Independent Press
Standards Organisation that The Herald breached Clause 1 (Accuracy), Clause 2
(Privacy), and Clause 3 (Harassment) of the Editors’ Code of Practice in an
article headlined “SNP trans row deepens as women's officer reported over
'hateful' remarks” published on 27 October 2019.
2. The article reported that the complainant, the women’s
officer of a local branch of a political party, had been reported to party
headquarters for making remarks which other members of her political party
considered to be transphobic and offensive. The article reported comments the
complainant had made on Facebook describing a transgender person as a “mental
f*****g pervy git”, describing transgender women in general as “things”, and
saying that transgender activists were “possessed by an evil dangerous cult”.
It also reported that she said that a transgender woman looked like a named
serial killer. The article then went on to quote from a message she had sent to
a prospective councillor. The article explained that the complainant had
initially contacted the prospective councillor via Facebook message to try to
gain her support in relation to a gender related issue. When the prospective
councillor indicated that she did not support the issue, in reply the
complainant said that transgender women “…are and will always be nothing but
men” and compared those who support transgender equality to Jehovah’s
Witnesses. The article reported comments from the prospective councillor, who
expressed her concern and said that it was “…very much coming from a place of
transphobia”. The article also included a response from the complainant to the
allegation that she was transphobic, in which she denied that she was
transphobic, describing herself as a “transgender ideology heretic”.
3. The article also appeared online in the same form, with
the headline “SNP women’s officer who called trans woman “mental pervy git” and
compared another to serial killer [name] reported to HQ”.
4. The complainant said that quoting from her Facebook
message to the prospective councillor constituted an intrusion into her
privacy, in breach of Clause 2. She said that although the first Facebook
message which she had sent to the prospective councillor was in the same terms
as messages which she had sent to approximately 20 individuals, it was
confidential. She said that the second message she had sent to the prospective
councillor, in which she said that transgender women “…are and will always be
nothing but men” and compared those who support transgender equality to
Jehovah’s Witnesses, was not intended for public consumption, and revealed her
own views on gender related issues. She also expressed concern that the article
identified the local party branch where she held the post of women’s officer.
5. The complainant also said that the article was misleading
in breach of Clause 1, because it had not included the context in which her
comments had been made. She said that if this context were included, it would
be clear that her criticisms of the transgender individuals and activists were
justified; she considered that she was responding to “outrageous intrusion into
women’s spaces by predatory, aggressive men”. She also raised concerns that the
article did not adequately distinguish which comments she had made on social
media, and which she had sent to the prospective councillor via Facebook
message. Finally, she also said that the article breached Clause 3, as the
reporter would have had to have “trawled” her public Facebook profile in order
to find her comments about the transgender individuals, and that the article
was a co-ordinated “attack” on her and those who shared her views.
6. The publication did not accept that there was a breach of
the Code. It said that reporting the complainant’s comments did not constitute
an intrusion into her privacy. The complainant accepted that her Facebook
profile was open to the public and so the publication said that the reporter
was free to report the comments she had made about the transgender individuals.
In relation to the messages she sent to the prospective councillor, the
publication did not accept that reporting these revealed anything private about
the complainant– it only reported her views on transgender people. It noted
that the complainant had sent her first Facebook message to approximately 20
other politicians to seek their support for her cause, and introduced herself
as a woman’s officer for the political party to which she belonged – it was
clear that she was not sending the messages in a personal capacity.
Furthermore, the publication said that when the reporter contacted the
complainant for comment, she made her aware that the article would be based on
her social media comments and message conversation with the prospective
councillor. She said that she was in shock when she received the message and
was not sure how to respond. The complainant did not raise any concerns that
this information was private, and instead gave a full response for publication
defending her remarks. Nevertheless, the publication said that there was a
public interest in reporting these comments, given the office held by the
complainant, and that there was an ongoing high profile debate about
transgender issues in Scottish politics, which it had been covering in several
articles over the past two years. It said that the reporter had spoken with the
assistant editor about the public interest in publishing the comments made by
the complainant.
7. The publication did not accept that the article was
misleading. It said that the complainant did not dispute that her comments had
been quoted accurately, and it was not necessary for the article to include the
full context of these comments for the article to be an accurate report of what
she said. It said that the article made clear what the complainant had posted
on social media, and what was said in the messages to the prospective
councillor. The publication did not accept that it had harassed the complainant
– it was allowed to report on the complainant’s publicly expressed views, as
she was entitled to express them.
Relevant Code Provisions
8. Clause 1 (Accuracy)
i) The Press must take care not to publish inaccurate,
misleading or distorted information or images, including headlines not
supported by the text.
ii) A significant inaccuracy, misleading statement or
distortion must be corrected, promptly and with due prominence, and — where
appropriate — an apology published. In cases involving IPSO, due prominence
should be as required by the regulator.
iii) A fair opportunity to reply to significant inaccuracies
should be given, when reasonably called for.
iv) The Press, while free to editorialise and campaign, must
distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture and fact.
9. Clause 2* (Privacy)
i) Everyone is entitled to respect for his or her private
and family life, home, health and correspondence, including digital
communications.
ii) Editors will be expected to justify intrusions into any
individual's private life without consent. In considering an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy, account will be taken of the complainant's
own public disclosures of information and the extent to which the material
complained about is already in the public domain or will become so.
10. Clause 3* (Harassment)
i) Journalists must not engage in intimidation, harassment
or persistent pursuit.
ii) They must not persist in questioning, telephoning,
pursuing or photographing individuals once asked to desist; nor remain on
property when asked to leave and must not follow them. If requested, they must
identify themselves and whom they represent.
iii) Editors must ensure these principles are observed by
those working for them and take care not to use non-compliant material from
other sources.
*The Public Interest
There may be exceptions to the clauses marked * where they
can be demonstrated to be in the public interest.
1. The public interest includes, but is not confined to:
2. There is a public interest in freedom of expression
itself.
3. The regulator will consider the extent to which material
is already in the public domain or will become so.
4. Editors invoking the public interest will need to
demonstrate that they reasonably believed publication - or journalistic
activity taken with a view to publication – would both serve, and be
proportionate to, the public interest and explain how they reached that
decision at the time.
5. An exceptional public interest would need to be
demonstrated to over-ride the normally paramount interests of children under
16.
Findings of the Committee
11. The Committee had regard for the terms of Clause 2(i), which specifically reference respect for a person’s digital communications. The question for the Committee was whether the article, in reporting the comments made by the complainant in the Facebook message, had reported information about which the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
12. In the first Facebook message, the complainant had
introduced herself as Women’s Officer of the local branch of a political party
and raised a political issue in respect of which she had sought the prospective
councillor’s support. The second message, from which the complainant's comments
had been quoted, had continued the exchange and contained no indication that
the complainant considered the exchange to be private. Further, the comments
made by the complainant which had been reported in the article related to the
political issue and not to an aspect of the complainant’s private life. In
light of these circumstances, the complainant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in relation to the information contained in the messages
and reporting the views which she had expressed on the political issue in the
second message did not constitute an intrusion into the complainant’s private
life. The complainant accepted that the comments she made about the transgender
individuals had been posted on a publicly accessible Facebook page. As such,
she did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of these
comments, and the publication was free to include them in the article. The
political office that a person holds, or the local branch of a political party
to which a person belongs, is not information about which a person generally
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. For all of these reasons, there was no
breach of Clause 2.
13. The complainant did not dispute that the article had
accurately reported the comments she had made on Facebook, and the message she
had sent to the prospective councillor. Omitting her perspective on why her
comments were justified did not make the article an inaccurate account of what
she had said, and it was not inaccurate to report that others had found her
remarks to be offensive and had raised the matter with the party to which the
complainant belonged. There was no breach of Clause 1. Clause 3 generally
relates to approaches made by journalists during the newsgathering process, and
not the decision to publish an article or focus on a topic. As such, the complainant’s
concerns under this Clause did not engage the terms of Clause 3.
Conclusions
14. The complaint was not upheld.
Remedial Action Required
15. N/A
Date complaint received: 12/02/2020
Date complaint concluded: 30/04/2020
The complainant complained to the Independent Complaints Reviewer about the process followed by IPSO in handling this complaint. The Independent Complaints Reviewer decided that the process was not flawed and did not uphold the request for review.
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